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Abstract 
Income-differentiated mortality, by reducing the share of poor persons in the population, leads to what 
can be called the "Mortality Paradox": the worse the survival conditions of the poor are, the lower the 
measured poverty is. We show that the extent to which FGT measures (Foster Greer Thorbecke 1984) 
underestimate old-age poverty under income-differentiated mortality depends on whether the 
prematurely dead would have, in case of survival, suffered from a more severe poverty than the average 
surviving population. Taking adjusted FGT measures with ex- tended lifetime income profiles as a 
benchmark, we identify conditions under which the selection bias induced by income-differentiated 
mortality is higher for distribution-sensitive measures than for headcount measures. Finally, we show, 
on the basis of data on poverty in 11 European economies, that the size of the selection bias varies 
across different sub-classes of FGT measures and across countries. 
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1 Introduction
In the recent decades, a voluminous empirical literature has emphasized that
mortality risks are negatively correlated with income.1 Lower incomes are sta-
tistically related with higher mortality risks. The relationship between income
and life expectancy is increasing, but non-linear, and exhibits a stronger slope
at low income levels (Backlund et al 1999).
Income-di¤erentiated mortality raises serious problems for poverty measure-
ment. Clearly, if low-income individuals tend to face higher mortality risks
than high-income individuals, standard poverty measures capture not only the
true poverty, but, also, the selection induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality.
The interferences or noise induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality lead to
what can be called the "Mortality Paradox": the worse the survival conditions
of the poor are, the lower the measured poverty is. The Mortality Paradox
is not caused by mortality per se, but by the correlation between income and
mortality risks. That correlation, by creating a selection bias, introduces some
interferences or noise in the measurement of poverty.2
At rst glance, the selection bias induced by income-di¤erentiated mortal-
ity seems to lead to an underestimation of the poverty phenomenon. To illus-
trate this, take standard headcount poverty measures. If low-income individuals
die earlier than non-poor individuals, those "missing poor" are not counted as
poor. Assuming little income mobility, those poor individuals would have been
counted as poor if they had faced the same survival conditions as the non-poor.
Therefore headcount measures underestimate the extent of poverty.
However, once we consider other poverty measures, which are sensitive to
the income distribution, the above rationale may not hold any more. Take, for
instance the class of poverty indicators known as the FGT measures (Foster
Greer Thorbecke 1984). FGT measures are a parametric family of poverty mea-
sures where the parameter is an indicator of aversion to poverty. When that
parameter equals 0, the poverty measure collapses to a simple headcount ratio,
but when that parameter is strictly positive, the poverty measure satises the
Monotonicity Axiom (i.e. a reduction in the income of the poor must increase
the poverty measure ceteris paribus). Moreover, if that parameter strictly ex-
ceeds 1, the poverty measure satises the Transfer Axiom (i.e. a pure transfer of
income from a poor to someone richer must increase the poverty measure ceteris
paribus). Distribution-sensitive poverty measures such as FGT measures may
not necessarily decrease when the survival conditions of some poor are wors-
ened. The measured poverty index may either go up or down, depending on the
overall e¤ect of that rise of mortality on the income distribution.
1See, among others, Duleep (1986), Deaton and Paxson (1998), Backlund et al (1999),
Deaton (2003), Jusot (2003), Duggan et al (2007) and Salm (2007). The unique exception is
Snyder and Evans (2006), who nd the opposite correlation.
2Note that the di¢ culties raised by income-di¤erentiated mortality concern all poverty
measures. Indeed, multidimensional poverty indicators (even those taking life expectancy
into account) compute poverty measures for a given population, and, as such, are also subject
to the noise induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality.
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The goal of this paper is to examine how income-di¤erentiated mortality
a¤ects FGT poverty measures, and, in particular, whether income-di¤erentiated
mortality leads FGT measures to over- or underestimate the extent of poverty.
For that purpose, we develop a simple theoretical model with income mobility
and income-di¤erentiated mortality, and study the behavior of FGT poverty
measures in that framework. We pay a particular attention to the following
questions. Are FGT measures subject to the Mortality Paradox? If yes, are all
subclasses of FGT measures equally subject to that selection bias?
In order to answer those questions, we will proceed in four stages. In a rst
stage, we identify, within our model, the conditions under which FGT measures
are invariant to changes in survival conditions for some income groups, and,
thus, escape from the Mortality Paradox. In a second stage, we propose, fol-
lowing the recent works by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007) and Lefebvre et al.
(2013), to construct adjusted FGT measures that are not subject to the Mortal-
ity Paradox. Those adjusted FGT poverty measures are obtained by extending,
through a ctitious income, the lifetime income proles of the prematurely dead
individuals, in such a way as to take those "missing poor" into account in the
measurement of poverty. Then, in a third stage, we construct, on the basis of
adjusted and unadjusted poverty measures, an index of the selection bias in
old-age poverty measurement due to income-di¤erentiated mortality. Finally,
the behavior of FGT measures is illustrated empirically on the basis of old-age
poverty data for 11 European countries.
Anticipating on our results, we rst show that, unlike headcount ratios, FGT
measures do not necessarily underestimate old-age poverty in the absence of in-
come mobility. This depends on whether the prematurely dead would have, in
case of survival, su¤ered from a more severe poverty than the average surviving
population. We also show that, once lifetime income proles of the prematurely
dead are extended, the robustness of adjusted FGT measures to variations in
mortality risk depends on how close the ctitious income mobility process for
the prematurely dead is to the actual income mobility process for the surviving
population. We also identify conditions under which the selection bias induced
by income-di¤erentiated mortality is higher for distribution-sensitive FGT mea-
sures than for headcount measures. Finally, the empirical application to Europe
reveals that (1) FGT poverty measures tend, in general to underestimate the
actual extent of poverty; (2) the size of the bias varies strongly across countries;
(3) the extent of the selection bias is larger for distribution-sensitive poverty
measures than for headcount measures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies the robustness of FGT measures to marginal changes in sur-
vival conditions. Section 4 proposes to extend income proles of the prematurely
dead, in such a way as to make adjusted FGT measures non-decreasing when the
survival conditions of the poor worsen. In Section 5, we construct, on the basis
of the unadjusted and adjusted FGT measures, an index of the selection bias
induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality. Section 6 uses data on 11 European
countries to compare the size of selection biases across di¤erent subclasses of
FGT measures and across di¤erent countries. Section 7 concludes.
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2 The model
We consider a two-period model, where a cohort, of size N 2 N, lives the young
age (rst period) for sure, whereas only some fraction of the population will
enjoy the old age (second period).3
There exists a nite number K 2 N of possible income levels (K > 1). The
set of possible income levels is: Y = fy1; :::; yKg. For the ease of presentation,
we assume that income levels are indexed in an increasing order, so that:
y1 < ::: < yK (1)
The number of young individuals with income yi 2 Y is denoted by n1i .4 We
denote by n1 the vector of size K, whose entries are n1k for k = 1; :::;K.
The probability of survival to the old age, denoted by , depends on the
income when being young. Following the literature, we assume that a higher in-
come when being young leads to higher survival chances.5 Hence income-specic
survival probabilities, which take K distinct values, are ranked as follows:
1 < ::: < K (2)
We denote by  the vector of size K whose entries are the income-specic sur-
vival probabilities k, for k = 1; :::;K. The number of surviving old individuals
with income yi 2 Y is denoted by n2i .6 We denote by n2 the vector of size K,
whose entries are n2k for k = 1; :::;K.
Denoting by ij the probability that a young agent with income yi enjoys,
in case of survival, an income yj at the old age, the income mobility can be
described, conditionally on survival, by the right stochastic matrix :
 
0BB@
11 12 ::: 1K
21 22 ::: 2K
::: ::: ::: :::
K1 K2 ::: KK
1CCA (3)
The income mobility matrix  concerns individuals who live the two periods.
As such, this does not take premature death into account, and, thus, leads to
an incomplete representation of the dynamics of income distribution.
Actually, the dynamics of income distribution can be represented by means
of the transition matrix M, of size K  K, which describes how the income
distribution at the young age determines the income distribution at the old age:
n2 = M0n1 (4)
3This formal framework is similar to the one developed in Lefèbvre et al (2013).
4We have:
PK
k=1 n
1
k = N .
5See Duleep (1986), Deaton and Paxson (1998), Jusot (2004) and Salm (2007).
6We have:
PK
k=1 n
2
k =
PK
k=1 kn
1
k.
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The transition matrix M is:
M 
0BB@
111 112 ::: 11K
221 222 ::: 22K
::: ::: ::: :::
KK1 KK2 ::: KKK
1CCA (5)
The M matrix fully describes the trajectories of individuals in our econ-
omy. The lifecycle trajectory depends on survival probabilities and on income
transition probabilities, which are correlated in terms of rank. We can easily de-
compose the matrixM into its two components: the income mobility component
and the survival process component:
M =   (6)
where     10K, 1K being the identity vector of size K, while the symbol 
refers to the Hadamard product, that is, the entrywise product of two matrices.
The M matrix includes, as a special case, the situation where there is no
premature death (i.e. i = 1 for all i). In that case, the matrix M reduces to
the income mobility matrix . Alternatively, if there is no mobility over the
lifecycle (i.e. ii = 1 for all i), the matrix M is a diagonal matrix with survival
probabilities i as entries.
3 Robustness of FGT measures
Let us assume that the poverty line is well-dened, and consists of the income
level yP 2 Y . Hence, the FGT poverty measure can be dened as follows.
Denition 1 Assume an economy with income distribution ni at age i = 1; 2.
If yP 2 Y is the poverty threshold, the FGT poverty measure at age i is:
P i =
1PK
j=1 n
i
j
P 1X
k=1
nik

yP   yk
yP

where   0.
As stressed in Foster et al (1984), the parameter  can be interpreted as an
indicator of aversion to poverty. When  = 0, the poverty index is a headcount
ratio, which, as such, is not reactive to income reductions of the poor. However,
once  > 0, income reductions of the poor increase, ceteris paribus, the measured
poverty, in line with the Monotonicity Axiom. Moreover, when  > 1, transfers
of income from a poor to a richer person raise, ceteris paribus, the poverty
measure, in line with the Transfer Axiom.
In order to examine the sensitivity of FGT poverty measures to changes in
survival conditions, we need rst to dene formally what we mean by a poverty
measure that is robust to changes in mortality. That property is known as the
Robustness to Mortality Changes (RMC).7
7On that property and some weaker versions of it, see Lefebvre et al (2013).
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Denition 2 A poverty measure P i satises Robustness to Mortality Changes
(RMC) if and only if a deterioration of the survival conditions of some group
leaves the measured poverty unchanged:
If

k > 
0
k for some k  K
k = 0k for other k  K
, then P i = P
i0
 :
That property states that the poverty measure should be left unchanged by
any variation in survival rates, whatever the income group considered. This is a
strong independence requirement, since it requires neutrality to hold whatever
the income mobility process is. But that requirement, if satised, makes poverty
measures immunized against the noise due to income-di¤erentiated mortality.
The following proposition states the necessary and su¢ cient condition so
that the FGT old-age poverty measure satises RMC.
Proposition 1 Consider a marginal change in m.
 The FGT old-age poverty measure P 2 satises RMC i¤:
PK
k=1 kn
1
k
 
P 1X
l=1
kl
h
yP yl
yP
i!
PK
j=1 jn
1
j
=
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

 When the LHS exceeds the RHS, we have, under m > 0m: P 2 < P 20 :
 When the RHS exceeds the LHS, we have, under m > 0m: P 2 > P 20 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that the FGT measure of old-age poverty is robust to
a change in survival rate m when the average transformed income gap among
all survivors who turned out to be poor at the old age is exactly equal to the
average income gap among the survivors within the particular income group
m. When the average income gap is strictly larger among the survivors within
the income group m than among all surviving individuals, a reduction in m
decreases the measured poverty. On the contrary, when the average income
gap is lower among the survivors in income m group than among the whole
population, a reduction in m raises the measured poverty.
In other words, Proposition 1 states that FGT measures are robust to a
deterioration of the survival conditions of some income group m if and only if
the prematurely dead within that income group would have, in case of survival,
su¤ered from exactly the same extent of poverty as the average surviving pop-
ulation. The perfect equivalence between, on the one hand, the poverty that
the prematurely dead would have faced in case of survival, and, on the other
hand, the average poverty in the surviving population, constitutes a quite strong
requirement, which is unlikely to be satised in most situations.
Note, however, that Proposition 1 shows that, in some cases, FGT poverty
measures are actually robust to changes in survival conditions. That result can
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be contrasted with what happens, in situation of no income mobility, under stan-
dard headcount measures. In that special case, the poverty measure necessarily
violates RMC, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume a marginal change in m under no income mobility (i.e.
kk = 1 for all k). The FGT old-age poverty measure P 20 violates RMC.
Proof. In that specic case, the condition of Proposition 1 becomes, when
ym < yP :
PP 1
k=1 kn
1
kPK
j=1 jn
1
j
= 1, which is obviously not satised, as the RHS exceeds
the LHS. On the contrary, when ym > yP , the condition becomes:
PP 1
k=1 kn
1
kPK
j=1 jn
1
j
=
0, which is not satised, as the LHS exceeds the RHS. Hence P 20 violates RMC.
Headcount measures violate RMC in the absence of income mobility, be-
cause, in that particular environment, a worsening of survival conditions for
some income group must necessarily a¤ect the measured poverty, either in one
direction or in the other. If the rise in mortality a¤ects the poor, the poverty
rate goes down. If, on the contrary, it a¤ects the non-poor, the poverty rate goes
up. But in both case, the change in the poverty measure is a mere consequence
of the selection process induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality. Indeed, if
all income groups were subject to the same rise or fall in mortality, there would
be no e¤ect on the measured poverty.
When considering more general poverty measures, on the contrary, the e¤ect
of di¤erential mortality on the measurement of poverty is less clear, even in the
absence of income mobility. If the transformed income gap for the group m
su¤ering from a deterioration of survival conditions
h
yP ym
yP
i
is equal to the
average income gap of the surviving population, the decline in m leaves the
poverty measure unchanged. Moreover, if
h
yP ym
yP
i
is lower than the average
income gap of the surviving population, the decline in m tends to raise - and
not to reduce - the poverty measure. Therefore FGT measures have, in situation
of income-di¤erentiated mortality, a behavior that is less clear than the one of
headcount measures.
In sum, the extent to which FGT old-age poverty measures are robust to
changes in mortality or not depends on whether the prematurely dead would
have, in case of survival, su¤ered from an equal extent of poverty in compari-
son with the average surviving population. When the deterioration of survival
conditions concerns a group with a higher probability to be poor at the old
age than the average surviving population, as well as having a larger income
gap with respect to the poverty line, it is very likely that such a worsening of
survival conditions reduces the measured poverty. Alternatively, when gains in
life expectancy only concern a high income group, with a very low probability
to become poor in case of survival, those gains contribute also to reduce the
measured poverty. Thus, there exist several ways in which changes in survival
conditions can a¤ect the measured poverty, and disconnect it from the "true"
poverty.
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4 Adjusting FGT measures
The condition under which FGT measures are robust to variations in survival
conditions across income groups is a strong condition, which is likely to be vi-
olated. Hence it is worth considering a way to adjust FGT poverty measures,
in such a way as to make these immunized against the noise due to income-
di¤erentiated mortality. For that purpose, we will follow here the remedy pro-
posed by Kanbur and Mukherjee (2007): the extension of the lifetime income
proles of the prematurely dead persons.
The assignment of a ctitious income to the premature dead implies that we
have now two, instead of one, income transition matrices: one for individuals
who survived to the old age, i.e. , and one for those who did not survive. We
will denote that latter income transition matrix by , of size K K:
 
0BB@
11 ::: ::: 1K
::: ::: ::: :::
::: ::: ::: :::
K1 ::: ::: KK
1CCA (7)
where ij is the probability, for an individual with income yi when being young,
to have a ctitious income ei = yj assigned to him when he is dead.
The adjusted old-age poverty rate, denoted by P^ 2, can be written as:
P^ 2 =
1PK
i=1 n
1
i
24 KX
j=1
jn
1
j
 
P 1X
k=1
jk

yP   yk
yP
!
+
KX
j=1
(1  j)n1j
 
P 1X
k=1
jk

yP   yk
yP
!35
(8)
The rst term in brackets is standard: it counts the poor individuals among the
old (surviving) population, and multiplies this by the transformed income gap.
But the second term in brackets is less standard: it measures poverty among
the individuals who did not survive, their ctitious incomes being assigned to
them through the matrix .
The adjusted poverty measure P^ 2 can take distinct forms, depending on: (1)
whether the assignment of ctitious incomes concerns all individuals or only the
initially poor; (2) whether ctitious incomes exceed or are below the poverty
line yP . Those two features of the extension are captured by the matrix .8
The next proposition examines the conditions on  under which P^ 2 satises
RMC.
Proposition 2 Consider a marginal change in m.
 The adjusted FGT old-age poverty measure P^ 2 satises RMC i¤:
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

=
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

8The level of the ctitious income (i.e. point (2)) depends on the entries of the  matrix,
whereas the subset of prematurely dead to which some ctious income is assigned is captured
by the size of . For instance, assignment only to the dead poor yields  of size (P   1) 
(P   1), against a size K K for an assignment for the whole prematurely dead population.
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 When the LHS exceeds the RHS, we have, under m > 0m: P^ 2 > P^ 20 :
 When the RHS exceeds the LHS, we have, under m > 0m: P^ 2 < P^ 20 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the adjusted FGT poverty measure is robust to
mortality changes within a group m if and only if the average extent of poverty
among the survivors of that particular group is exactly equal to the average
extent of poverty among the non-survivors of that group. An obvious case
where such a robustness holds occurs when the matrix  is identical to the pure
income mobility matrix . That case is obviously not the only one. In other
words, the identity between matrices  and  is a su¢ cient - but not a necessary
condition for the robustness of the adjusted FGT measure to mortality changes.
The general condition is that the average extent of poverty among the survivors
within the group undergoing the change in mortality should be equal to the
average extent of poverty among the non-survivors of that group. Otherwise, the
adjusted poverty measure may either increase or decrease as survival conditions
are deteriorated.
In the light of those results, it seems that adding the "missing" poor, i.e. the
prematurely dead persons, does not necessary su¢ ce to make old-age poverty
measures necessarily robust to variations in survival conditions. Whether such
a robustness will be achieved or not depends on the shape of the matrix , that
is, the income mobility matrix in terms of ctitious income.
Given that robustness holds when the matrix  is identical to the pure
income mobility matrix , a rst, natural candidate consists of making the
matrix  equal to the matrix :
 =
0BB@
11 12 ::: 1K
21 22 ::: 2K
::: ::: ::: :::
K1 K2 ::: KK
1CCA (9)
Making such an assumption on the matrix  would denitely guarantee a
robustness of the adjusted FGT measure, and, as a consequence, would make it
fully immunized against the Mortality Paradox.
However, the di¤erent entries of that matrix are hard to identify, since the
income mobility process that we can observe is given by the M matrix, which is
reects both the pure income mobility process and income-di¤erentiated mor-
tality (see supra). Given the di¢ culty to identify empirically the matrix , one
may opt for alternative candidates for the matrix .
A natural candidate consists of the identity matrix:
 =
0BB@
1 0 ::: 0
0 ::: ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 ::: 0 1
1CCA (10)
Under that specication, prematurely dead persons are assigned a ctitious
income equal to their income when being alive. Such an adjustments amounts
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to treat premature death as something "neutral". In case of very little income
mobility, that assumption is very close to imposing the matrix , which makes
the adjusted FGT measures robust to changes in mortality.
Another possibility is to assign, to all prematurely dead persons, a ctitious
income level that is inferior to the actual income enjoyed when being alive,
in such a way as to reect the fact that a premature death is a major cause
of deprivation on its own. Under that alternative adjustment, poverty is not
restricted to low incomes, but also includes premature death, in line with Sen
(1998)s emphasis on the necessity to count premature death as a component
of poverty. For that purpose, one possibility, which is discussed in Lefebvre
et al (2013), consists of taking the "welfare-neutral" income yN , which brings
indi¤erence, at the individual level, between, on the one hand, survival with
that income, and, on the other hand, death. That welfare neutral income is
dened such a way that:
U(u(yi); u(yN )) = U(u(yi);
) (11)
where U(u(yi); u(yN )) is a separable lifetime welfare function, whereas 
 is the
utility of being dead, usually normalized to zero.
In that case, the matrix  is the column matrix:
 =
0BB@
0 1 ::: 0
0 1 ::: 0
::: ::: ::: :::
0 1 0 0
1CCA (12)
where iN = 1 and ij = 0 for j 6= N .
Clearly, in this case, the adjusted poverty measure is di¤erent from what
would have prevailed in the absence of any income-di¤erentiated mortality; it
counts a premature death as something that is a source of poverty, and, hence,
is not neutral.
Proposition 2 states the conditions under which the associated adjusted FGT
poverty measures satisfy RMC.
Proposition 3 Consider a marginal change in m.
 The adjusted FGT old-age poverty measure P^ 2 with  being the identity
matrix satises RMC i¤:
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

=

yP   ym
yP

Otherwise, when the LHS exceeds the RHS, we have, under m > 0m:
P^ 2 > P^
20
 ; when the RHS exceeds the LHS, we have, under m > 
0
m:
P^ 2 < P^
20
 :
10
 The adjusted FGT old-age poverty measure P^ 2 with  being a column
matrix with iN = 1 satises RMC i¤:
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

=

yP   yN
yP

Otherwise, when the LHS exceeds the RHS, we have, under m > 0m:
P^ 2 > P^
20
 ;when the RHS exceeds the LHS, we have, under m > 
0
m:
P^ 2 < P^
20
 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the income group su¤ering from a deterioration of survival conditions
is very poor, that deterioration increases the adjusted FGT poverty measure
when the ctitious incomes are equal to past incomes. Moreover, when the
ctitious income is set to the welfare-neutral income, a deterioration of the
survival conditions also increases the adjusted FGT poverty measure, especially
if the welfare-neutral income yN is very low.
In the light of this, adjusted FGT poverty measures under those two alter-
native specications of the income mobility matrix  may increase rather than
decrease when the survival conditions of the poor deteriorate. The size of the
change may vary strongly across the two adjustment techniques. In particular,
relying on the welfare-neutral income may lead to a larger extent of poverty
for the - now incorporated - "missing poor", as well as to a larger number of
persons counted as poor. The precise extent to which the adjustment technique
a¤ects the measured poverty depends also on the prevailing income distribution,
as well as on the pure income mobility process of the economy.
5 Selection bias under di¤erent values of 
As stated in Section 3, FGT poverty measures may, under some conditions,
vary with a deterioration of the survival conditions faced by the poor, and,
hence, may be subject to the Mortality Paradox. It is not straightforward to
measure the extent to which FGT measures are indeed underestimating the
"true" extent of poverty. However, a simple way to proxy the size of the mea-
surement error induced by the selection bias consists of taking adjusted FGT
poverty measures with extended income proles as a benchmark, and, in a sec-
ond stage, of taking the gap between the two poverty measures (the adjusted
and the unadjusted one) as an indicator of the size of the selection bias induced
by income-di¤erentiated mortality. By doing so, we will be able, in the light of
the size of the selection bias, to examine whether headcount ratios are more or
less subject to the Mortality Paradox than other poverty measures, such as the
average of poverty gap and the squared poverty gap ratios.
Let us start with dening a measure of the selection bias induced by income-
di¤erentiated mortality. Taking the adjusted poverty measures as a benchmark,
we propose the following index of the selection bias.
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Denition 3 The selection bias index at the old age B2 is dened as:
B2 = 1 
P 2
P^ 2
Note that, by construction, the selection bias index B2 equals 0 when the
unadjusted and the adjusted poverty measure are equal, and is equal to 1 when
the unadjusted poverty measure equals 0, while the adjusted poverty measure
is strictly positive. The bias index B2 is increasing in the gap between the
adjusted and the unadjusted poverty measures.
At this stage, it should be stressed that the particular selection bias that
is measured by the index B2 depends on how the adjusted poverty measure
P^ 2 is constructed. If, for instance, P^
2
 is based on a matrix  that is identical
to the matrix , the index B2 captures a pure selection bias: it gives us the
precise extent to which unadjusted poverty measures have tended to underesti-
mate poverty, in comparison to a hypothetical situation where prematurely dead
persons from all income classes would have survived and faced the same income
mobility conditions as others. Alternatively, when P^ 2 is based on a matrix 
that is the identity matrix, then the bias index B2 reects the extent to which
unadjusted poverty measures have underestimated poverty in comparison to a
hypothetical situation where prematurely dead persons from all income classes
would have survived and enjoyed the same income as when being alive. Fi-
nally, when P^ 2 is based on a matrix  that is a column matrix at yN , then the
bias index B2 reects the extent to which unadjusted poverty measures have
underestimated poverty in comparison to a hypothetical situation where pre-
maturely dead persons from all income classes would have survived and enjoyed
an income that is equivalent, in terms of welfare, to being dead. Therefore the
meaning and interpretation of the bias index depend on its construction.
Let us now study how the bias index varies with the level of . A rst
question to ask is whether headcount poverty measures are more subject to
the Mortality Paradox than the average poverty gap? One may also wonder
whether the average poverty gap is more subject to the Mortality Paradox than
the squared poverty gap ratios. The following Proposition states the condition
under which a rise in  reduces the bias index.
Proposition 4  Comparing the selection bias index B2 under average
poverty gap ( = 1) and under head-count ( = 0), we have:
B21 T B20
()
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j=1(1  j)n1j
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h
yP yk
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h
yP yl
yP
i T PKj=1(1  j)n1jPP 1k=1 jkPK
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1
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 Comparing the selection bias index B2 under squared average poverty gap
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( = 2) and under average poverty gap ( = 1), we have:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The conditions stated in Proposition 4 can be interpreted as follows. Raising
the coe¢ cient  in the FGT measure contributes to raise the measurement bias
due to income-di¤erentiated mortality if and only if a higher  increases the
relative size of the hidden poverty in comparison to the poverty that is measured
in the absence of income proles extension.
The relative size of the hidden poverty depends strongly on the level of
the ctitious income assigned to the prematurely dead. For instance, whether
the average poverty gap measure (i.e.  = 1) leads to a larger bias than the
headcount poverty measure (i.e.  = 0) depends on whether the extent of
poverty for the "missing poor" is large or not. When the ctitious incomes
assigned to the prematurely dead are close to the poverty line (or above it), the
measurement bias induced income-di¤erentiated mortality is smaller under the
average poverty gap measure than under the headcount poverty measure. On
the contrary, if ctitious incomes are much lower than the poverty line, then
FGT measures with  = 0 are likely to be less biased than FGT measures with
 = 1, and, a fortiori, than FGT measures with  = 2.
Given the central role played by the ctitious income, the form of the tran-
sition matrix  a¤ects the size of the measured selection bias. The following
corollary highlights the inuence of the  matrix on the bias index B2.
Corollary 2 Let us denote by I the  matrix with the identity form and by
N the  matrix with the column form at income yN . Under a su¢ ciently small
level of the welfare-neutral yN < yP , we have:
B2I < B
2
N
The reason why the selection bias is higher when the welfare-neutral income
is assigned to all prematurely dead persons lies in the fact that the selection
bias includes, under the matrix N , not only the extent to which unadjusted
poverty measures ignore the "missing poor", but, also, the extent to which they
neglect the "hidden poverty", that is, they neglect premature deaths as sources
of poverty and deprivation. In the light of that di¤erent, broader denition of
selection bias, it is no surprise that the bias index takes a larger value under N
than under I . This inequality in terms of selection bias induced by income-
di¤erentiated mortality holds for all classes of FGTmeasures. Indeed, even when
the intensity of poverty is not taken into account, the fact that all prematurely
dead persons are assigned a ctitious income equal to the neutral income - and
thus below the poverty line - su¢ ces to make the measurement bias index larger
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in that case, in comparison to what holds when the prematurely dead persons
are assigned a ctitious income equal to the income enjoyed when being alive.
For  > 0, the same result holds, since the intensity of poverty is also larger
when adopting the neutral income level as a ctitious income. One may even
expect the inequalities between bias indexes to be increased, since taking the
intensity of poverty into account is likely to strengthen the - already large -
inuence of the ctitious income mobility matrix.
In the light of those results, it appears that the precise size of the measure-
ment bias due to income-di¤erentiated mortality varies not only with the kind of
FGT measure used (i.e. the level of ), but, also, with the ctitious income that
is used. Given that the precise extent to which the chosen FGT measure and
the chosen ctitious income mobility process a¤ect the size of the measurement
bias depends on the prevailing income distribution, as well as on the extent
of premature death, it is worth considering real data on income distribution
and premature death to understand how sensitive FGT poverty measures are to
di¤erential mortality. The next section aims at illustrating that discussion by
means of data on European economies.
6 Evidence: old-age poverty in Europe
As shown above, it is not straightforward to see, in theory, whether FGT poverty
measures are subject to the Mortality Paradox, and, if yes, whether headcount
poverty measures ( = 0) are more or less biased than income-distribution
sensitive measures such as the average income gap ( = 1) and the squared
income gap ( = 2). The goal of this section is to explore that issue empirically,
on the basis of data on 11 European economies.
6.1 Data
The analysis is based on poverty data from the European household survey EU-
SILC for the year 2007, and on the life expectancy by education level made
available by Eurostat (2010).9 Due to the limited availability of comparable
life expectancy statistics by educational level, 11 countries are included in the
data set: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden.
Given that the selection bias induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality is
likely to be larger at higher ages, we will focus, throughout this section, on
the measurement of old-age poverty, dened as poverty in the population aged
60 or more. The raw data on poverty in Europe in 2007 are presented in
Table 1. Focusing rst on simple headcount poverty measures, we see that the
measured poverty at the old age varies strongly across countries. For instance,
whereas only 5.5 % of the population aged 60 and more is below the poverty
threshold in the Czech Republic, fractions as high as one fourth of the population
aged 60 and more are below the poverty line in countries such as Estonia and
9See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/population/data/database.
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Portugal. Note also that, although women exhibit, in all countries under study,
higher headcount poverty measures than men, the distribution of poverty across
genders varies signicantly across countries. In some countries, such as Hungary
or Poland, the proportion of persons in poverty at the old age is approximately
the same for men and women. On the contrary, in countries like the Czech
Republic or Norway, the poverty gap between women and men is much larger:
the prevalence of poverty at the old age is, in those countries, about three times
larger among women than among men.
If one now considers the extent of poverty, measured through the average
income gap (P1) or squared income gap (P2), further observations can be made.
A rst observation is that the ranking of countries in terms of poverty varies
signicantly according to the FGT measure used. For instance, Norway exhibits
a higher proportion of poor persons in the population in comparison to Hungary
(14.3 % against 10.7 %), but the extent of poverty, as measured by the average
income gap, is lower in Norway than in Hungary (2.2 % against 2.5 %).10 Fur-
thermore, the size and sign of the poverty gender gap also varies with the FGT
measure used. For instance, poverty among men is lower than among women in
Poland when using headcount ratios, but the extent of poverty is larger among
men than among women when focusing on the squared income gap.
P0 (%) P1 (%) P2 (%)
Countries total males females total males females total males females
Czech Rep. 5.5 2.6 7.6 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.2
Denmark 13.0 11.2 14.5 1.6 1.1 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.6
Estonia 24.5 15.8 29.2 4.1 3.1 4.6 1.3 1.2 1.3
Finland 19.1 14.9 22.2 2.7 2.1 3.2 0.7 0.5 0.7
Hungary 10.7 8.9 11.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.2 1.3 1.1
Italy 20.8 17.6 23.3 5.1 4.2 5.7 2.3 1.9 2.6
Norway 14.3 7.1 20.0 2.2 1.4 2.9 0.7 0.6 0.8
Poland 9.1 8.3 9.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.6 0.7 0.6
Portugal 24.9 23.1 26.3 6.4 5.9 6.9 2.7 2.5 2.8
Slovenia 18.1 11.7 22.5 4.1 2.9 5.0 1.6 1.3 1.8
Sweden 10.2 6.7 13.1 1.8 1.1 2.4 0.6 0.4 0.7
Table 1: FGT poverty measures at age 60+, for year 2007.11
Table 1 provides a contrasted picture of old-age poverty in Europe: old-
age poverty levels vary across countries and gender, and are also sensitive to
the FGT measure that is used. Note, however, that the picture provided by
Table 1 may actually hide even larger discrepancies across European economies,
10P1 measures can be interpreted as follows: individuals whose income is below the poverty
line in e.g. Estonia have, on average, an income that is equal to 100 - 4.1 = 95.9 % of the
poverty line. Regarding P2 measures, these can be interpreted as follows. Persons whose
income is below the poverty line in e.g. Estonia have, on average, an income whose relative
gap with respect to the poverty line raised to the power 2 is equal to 1.3 %.
11For each country, the poverty threshold is xed at 60 % of the median income.
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which are related to di¤erentials in survival conditions across those countries.
Di¤erential income-specic survival conditions across countries may, by leading
to a more or less large number of "missing poor" - and a more or less large
"hidden poverty" across those countries, distort the picture provided by Table 1.
Those distortions due to di¤erent interferences caused by income-di¤erentiated
mortality may concern the di¤erent FGT measures, to various extent.
In order to identify the impact of income-di¤erentiated mortality on poverty
measurement, we need data on survival conditions by income levels. There is,
to our knowledge, no lifetable by income for the European countries. However,
Eurostat, produces comparable information on mortality by education.12 To il-
lustrate the di¤erentials in life expectancy between and within countries, Tables
2 and 3 show, respectively, the life expectancy statistics at age 60 by gender,
and by education level (primary, secondary and tertiary).13
Life expectancy at 60
Countries total men woman
Czech Rep 20.8 18.5 22.7
Denmark 21.9 20.3 23.3
Estonia 19.7 15.9 22.5
Finland 23.3 20.8 25.6
Hungary 19.4 16.6 21.7
Italy 24.3 22.0 26.2
Norway 23.4 21.5 25.1
Poland 20.8 17.9 23.2
Portugal 23.1 21.0 25.1
Slovenia 22.2 19.4 24.5
Sweden 23.6 22.0 25.1
Table 2: Life expectancy at age 60 by gender 2007.
Life expectancy at 60
Countries primary secondary tertiary
Czech Rep 20.68 20.38 23.55
Denmark 21.25 22.02 22.94
Estonia 16.53 20.25 22.76
Finland 22.91 23.45 24.30
Hungary 17.91 21.25 21.20
Italy 23.87 25.94 25.82
Norway 22.57 23.58 24.43
Poland 20.28 20.74 22.74
Portugal 23.06 23.58 24.04
Slovenia 21.86 22.13 23.43
Sweden 23.06 23.69 24.58
Table 3: Life expectancy at age 60 by education level, 2007.
12See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/population/data/database.
13Note that the data for Poland and Portugal are for year 2008 and 2009 respectively.
16
Table 2 shows the existence of signicant inequalities in longevity across
Europe. The lowest life expectancy at age 60 is measured in Hungary (19.4
years), while the largest one is measured in Italy (24.3 years). Table 2 also
highlights that the gender gap between women and men varies across countries,
from 3 years in Denmark to 6.6 years in Estonia. However, as shown in Table 3,
aggregate life expectancy statistics hide also large inequalities within countries,
depending on the education level. The education gap in terms of life expectancy
is very small is some countries, such as Sweden, where the life expectancy at
age 60 for individuals with tertiary education is only 1.5 year larger than the
one for individuals with primary education only. On the contrary, the education
gap is much larger in Estonia, where it is equal to about 6.2 years.
The varying life expectancy gap across countries suggests that selection bi-
ases in poverty measurement are likely to be varying across countries. In order
to have a conrmation of that conjecture, we need rst to use the education-
specic lifetables provided by Eurostat in order to extrapolate lifetables by
income levels. For that purpose, we use a weighted ordinary least square re-
gression, in line with Bossuyt et al (2004) and Van Oyen et al (2005). Taking
into account the high correlation that exists between education and income,
we can extrapolate mortality by income class on the basis of the mortality by
education, by relating the distributions of individuals on both dimensions. For
that purpose, we rst transform the absolute educational status into a relative
educational status. Indeed among cohorts, the size of educational groups has
changed. Young people studied more than older ones. For a given cohort, we
represent each category of education by its size in the population. We then
order these categories from the lowest level to the highest on a scale from 0 to
100%. That is each category of income represents a percentage of the total pop-
ulation of the cohort. This scale gives us a distribution of the cohort population
according to education. We assume that the reference of an education category
is determined by its relative position, dened as the mid-point of the proportion
of the category represented on the ordered scale of 100% (Pamuk, 1985, 1988).14
We then regress the life expectancy by education on the reference mid-point of
the education category by weighting for the prevalence of the category, i.e. the
relative size of the educational level. The slope of the regression line represents
the di¤erence in mortality between the bottom and the top of the education
hierarchy. Once estimated, the coe¢ cients can be used to compute lifetables
according to income. This is done by assuming that the social hierarchy given
by the income is similar to the one given by education. We can thus apply the
coe¢ cient of one education category to the corresponding categories of income.
Figures 1 and 2 show, for the 11 European countries under study, the esti-
mated life expectancy at age 60 by income class, for males and females respec-
tively. For each country, life expectancy at age 60 is increasing with the income
class considered. However, the longevity di¤erential related to income inequal-
14For example, if the rst category is given by those with at most a primary degree and
represents 10% of the cohort, the mid-point reference will be 5%. If the second category
represents, lets say those with a secondary degree, 20% of the population, the bounds of the
category in the distribution are 10 and 30% and the mid-point is 20%.
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ity varies strongly across countries. The life expectancy di¤erential is especially
large in Estonia and in the Czech Republic. On the contrary, it is much lower
in Sweden and Denmark. Moreover, the life expectancy gap tends to be larger
for males (Figure 1) than for females (Figure 2). The signicant variation in
the size of the life expectancy gap in terms of income levels across countries and
across gender implies that the selection bias in poverty measurement resulting
from income-di¤erentiated mortality is likely to vary also across countries and
gender.
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Figure 1: Life expectancy at age 60 by income class in Europe, males.
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Figure 2: Life expectancy at age 60 by income class in Europe, females.
6.2 The adjustment technique
The adjustment of FGT poverty measures is made in two steps. First, we need
to compute the number of "missing" persons for each country and each gender.
Second, we need to assign a ctitious income to those "missing persons".
Regarding the rst task, the number of "missing" individuals in each income
class is computed, for each country and each gender, by calculating the hypo-
thetical number of individuals of that class who would have survived if they had
beneted from the survival conditions of the highest income class, for that coun-
try and that gender. Assuming a stable demography, that number of "missing"
individuals in an income class can be obtained by multiplying the number of
surviving individuals in that class by a coe¢ cient equal to the ratio of income-
specic life expectancies of the highest income class to the actual income class.
As an illustration of that adjustment, Table 4 shows, for each country and each
gender, the life expectancy statistics at age 60 for the bottom income class and
for the top income class, as well as the corresponding adjustment coe¢ cient.
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bottom income top income Adjustment factor
Countries males females males females males females
Czech Rep. 14.6 21.6 22.9 24.6 1.57 1.14
Denmark 19.3 22.5 22.0 25.1 1.14 1.12
Estonia 11.7 20.4 21.6 25.1 1.85 1.23
Finland 19.6 25.1 22.4 26.3 1.14 1.05
Hungary 14.1 20.8 21.8 23.7 1.54 1.14
Italy 20.0 25.2 25.1 28.0 1.25 1.11
Norway 20.0 24.2 23.1 26.4 1.16 1.09
Poland 15.8 22.4 20.4 24.3 1.29 1.09
Portugal 20.0 24.6 22.1 25.8 1.11 1.05
Slovenia 17.1 23.9 21.6 25.3 1.26 1.06
Sweden 21.4 24.7 23.7 26.7 1.11 1.08
Table 4: Life expectancy at age 60 for bottom and top income classes and the
associated adjustment coe¢ cient, 2007.
Adjustment factors for the lowest income class are larger for males than for
females, in line with the higher gaps in terms of life expectancy by income class.
There is also a variation in adjustment factors across countries: these are large
in Estonia and Czech Republic, but much smaller for Finland and Portugal.
Regarding the second task, which consists of assigning a ctitious income to
all those "missing" persons, we will, adopt two alternative approaches, which
consists of two distinct matrices .15 The rst approach consists of assigning, to
each missing person, a ctitious income equal to the income previously enjoyed.
That approach consists of assuming that  is an identity matrix. In that case, a
premature death is, in some sense, treated as neutral for poverty measurement.
Another, alternative approach, consists of counting a premature death as a
source of deprivation, which leads to assign, as a ctitious income, the income
equivalent of death, that is, yN .
That welfare-neutral income, which makes an agent indi¤erent between, on
the one hand, further life with that income, and, on the other hand, death,
can be calibrated by following the work by Becker et al (2005). Taking income
as a proxy for consumption, and assuming that individuals have time-additive
preferences with a temporal utility function of the form u(y) = y
1 1=
1 1= + ,
it is possible to derive the welfare-neutral income yN . yN makes the utility
associated to a life-period equal to the utility of being dead:
y
1 1=
N
1  1= +  = 0 (13)
Following Becker et al (2005), we take  = 1:25. Regarding the calibration
of , we also follow Becker et al (2005), who use the estimation of "  u0(y)yu(y) =
0:346 from Murphy and Topel (2003) to extrapolate the level of . The value of
" is estimated from compensating di¤erentials for occupational mortality risks;
15On the relative strengths and weaknesses of those approaches, see Lefebvre et al (2013).
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it captures how individuals make trade-o¤ between more income and more risk.
Then, for each country, we calculate the level of  on the basis of the average
income, while assuming  = 1:25 and " = 0:346. Then, in a last stage, we
compute, for each country, and on the basis of the parameters  and  (the
former being country-specic), the level of the welfare-neutral income yN . Table
5 shows the values of the welfare-neutral income yN for each country.16
Welfare-neutral ctitious income
Countries (euros 2007)
Czech Rep 77
Denmark 449
Estonia 54.5
Finland 347
Hungary 67
Italy 265
Norway 626
Poland 53
Portugal 136
Slovenia 149
Sweden 339
Table 5: Welfare-neutral income in Europe, 2007.
The welfare-neutral income yN is extremely low, which is not surprising.
Moreover, it varies strongly across countries, because of di¤erences in standards
of living (i.e. the level of the average income in the country), which lead to
di¤erent levels of the intercept . Those di¤erences may seem, at rst glance,
surprising. However, similar inequalities would be obtained under alternative
calibration techniques using country-specic income and risk-taking attitudes.17
6.3 Results
Table 6 shows the adjusted FGT measures for poverty at age 60 and more
obtained while assigning to each missing individual a ctitious income equal to
the past income enjoyed.18 In comparison with the unadjusted FGT poverty
measures (Table 1), adjusted FGT measures are signicantly higher. Those
higher levels reect the inclusion, within all income classes, of the missing,
prematurely dead, persons. Given that low income classes are also characterized
by worse survival conditions - and thus require the addition of a larger number
of missing persons -, low income classes include, proportionally, higher numbers
16Those gures are expressed in yearly terms.
17See, for instance, the meta-analysis made by Miller (2000) showing large di¤erentials in
the value of a statistical life across countries, depending on the income level.
18Throughout this section, the poverty line is assumed to keep the same level as before the
adjustment. That assumption is in line with the framework developed in Sections 2-5. Note
that this assumption constitutes an obvious simplication, since the addition of prematurely
dead persons to the population may potentially a¤ect the level of the poverty line, and, hence,
poverty measures. That e¤ect is discussed in Lefebvre et al (2013).
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of added people than high income classes. Note, however, that, in theory, there
was no obvious reason why FGT measures would necessarily be increased by
the adjustment: this depends, in ne, on whether the prematurely dead would
have, in case of survival, su¤ered from a more severe poverty than the average
surviving population. Table 6, when compared to Table 1, shows that adjusted
poverty measures are unambiguously higher than unadjusted poverty measures.
P^0 (%) P^1 (%) P^2 (%)
Countries total males females total males females total males females
Czech Rep. 5.7 3.1 8.0 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.2
Denmark 13.5 11.6 15.0 1.7 1.2 2.1 0.5 0.3 0.6
Estonia 26.2 19.3 31.0 4.5 4.0 4.9 1.5 1.5 1.4
Finland 19.5 15.7 22.5 2.8 2.2 3.3 0.7 0.6 0.8
Hungary 11.7 10.8 12.4 2.8 3.0 2.6 1.3 1.6 1.2
Italy 21.9 19.2 24.1 5.4 4.6 6.0 2.4 2.1 2.7
Norway 14.7 7.6 20.5 2.3 1.5 3.0 0.7 0.6 0.8
Poland 9.6 9.3 9.9 1.9 2.0 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.6
Portugal 25.5 23.9 26.7 6.6 6.1 7.0 2.8 2.6 2.9
Slovenia 18.6 12.9 22.9 4.3 3.2 5.1 1.6 1.5 1.9
Sweden 10.4 7.0 13.4 1.8 1.1 2.4 0.6 0.4 0.7
Table 6: Adjusted FGT poverty measures at age 60+, for year 2007
(ctitious income = past income).19
Note, however, that the extent of the adjustment varies signicantly across
countries. The adjustment is very small in Sweden (+ 0.2 % for the headcount
ratio), in Czech republic (+ 0.2 %), in Norway (+0.4 %) and in Finland (+ 0.4
%), but is much larger in countries such as Estonia (+ 1.7 % for the headcount
ratio), Italy (+ 1.1 %) and Hungary (+1.0 %). This result reects that the size
of interferences induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality on poverty measures
vary across countries. Another observation concerns the gender poverty gap.
Table 6 suggests that, once poverty measures are adjusted, the gap between
poverty prevalences among men and women is signicantly reduced. For in-
stance, whereas the gender gap in Estonia was equal to 29.2 % - 15.8 % = 13.4
% in unadjusted terms (headcount), it is reduced to 31 % - 19.3 % = 11.7 % once
poverty measures are adjusted. Hence the inclusion of the "missing persons"
does not only a¤ect the overall poverty prevalence, but also lowers the gender
poverty gap, even though women remain, on average, more subject to poverty.
In order to identify how the adjustment of poverty measures inuence the
magnitudes of poverty across di¤erent FGT measures (i.e. for di¤erent values
of ), Figure 3 shows the levels of the selection bias index under  equal to 0,
1 and 2 (total population). The size of the selection bias induced by income-
di¤erentiated mortality varies strongly across countries. Whereas it remains
below 5 % in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden, the
bias index reaches much higher levels in Estonia, Hungary and Poland.
19For each country, the poverty threshold is xed at 60 % of the median income.
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Figure 3: Selection bias index for FGT
measures, total population (ctitious income =
past income)
Another important lesson from Figure 3 concerns the variation of the selec-
tion bias index across FGT measures of poverty for a given country. At the
theoretical level, there was no obvious clue regarding the behavior of the selec-
tion bias index when  varies. However, Figure 3 shows that, for the countries
under study, the selection bias index tends to be higher for squared income
gap measures ( = 2) than for average income gap measures ( = 1) and for
headcount measures ( = 0). Hence, when the FGT poverty measure takes also
into account the distribution of income, it is more subject to the selection bias
induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality. Note that the extent to which the
selection bias index increases with  varies across countries. Those variations
reect the di¤erentials between income distributions across countries.
Let us now contrast those results with what is obtained under alternative
ctitious incomes. For that purpose, Table 7 shows the adjusted FGT poverty
measures when the ctitious income used for the extension of income proles of
the prematurely dead persons consists of the welfare-neutral income yN . Note
that the income gap or the squared income gap is expected to be more sensitive
to the level of ctitious incomes than the headcount. The reason is that adopting
the number 0 for all the poor made to survive or their past income that is below
the poverty line has, by construction, the same impact on the headcount, but
not on the income gap.
In the light of Table 7, several observations can be made. Firstly, the ad-
justed FGT poverty measures take, under that alternative ctitious income,
much larger levels than when ctitious incomes are equalized to past incomes.
That result comes from the low levels of the welfare-neutral income yN (see Ta-
ble 5). Hence, when one considers premature death as a source of poverty and
deprivation, and include it in poverty measures under the form of the income
equivalent to death, poverty measures become much larger.
A second important point to be stressed concerns the strong di¤erentials
across countries. The adjustment using the welfare-neutral income as a cti-
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tious income increases the old-age poverty rate (headcount) by 3.3 % in Denmark
and by 4.1 % in Sweden (in comparison to the unadjusted poverty rate), but
by 14 % for Estonia, and by 13.5 % in Czech Republic, and by 10.5 % in Hun-
gary. Those large adjustments reect the stronger di¤erentials in life expectancy
across income classes in those countries (Figures 1 and 2).
P^0 (%) P^1 (%) P^2 (%)
Countries total males females total males females total males females
Czech Rep. 19.0 24.3 14.4 14.5 22.0 7.9 13.7 21.2 7.1
Denmark 16.3 14.9 17.5 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.0 4.2 3.9
Estonia 38.5 40.1 37.4 21.5 30.5 15.3 18.7 28.4 12.1
Finland 23.0 21.2 24.4 7.3 9.1 5.9 5.2 7.4 3.4
Hungary 21.2 25.8 17.9 13.6 20.0 9.1 12.2 18.6 7.6
Italy 27.1 26.6 27.5 12.4 14.3 10.8 9.6 12.0 7.6
Norway 19.4 14.0 23.9 8.0 8.5 7.6 6.3 7.4 5.4
Poland 15.0 17.7 13.2 8.1 11.6 5.6 6.8 10.3 4.3
Portugal 27.8 27.2 28.3 9.9 10.7 9.3 6.2 7.4 5.3
Slovenia 23.6 21.8 25.1 10.5 14.0 8.0 7.9 12.1 4.9
Sweden 14.3 11.4 16.8 6.2 5.9 6.5 4.9 5.1 4.8
Table 7: Adjusted FGT poverty measures at age 60+, for year 2007
(ctitious income = welfare-neutral income).20
A third observation concerns the size of the gender gap. Once the welfare-
neutral income is used to extend the income proles of the prematurely dead,
the form of the poverty gender gap is strongly altered in some countries. In
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Poland, the headcount poverty measure
is larger among men than among women, whereas the opposite was prevailing in
unadjusted poverty measures. The reversal of the poverty gender gap observed
in those countries is due to the fact that income-related di¤erentials in survival
conditions are much larger among men than among women in those countries.
Therefore, once the "missing" persons are added and are assigned yN as a cti-
tious income, the poverty gender gap is reversed. Note that, in other countries,
females remain, after the adjustment, more subject to poverty than men.
Finally, let us compute the selection bias index under that alternative ad-
justment of FGT poverty measures (Figure 4). As we emphasized in Corollary
5, the selection bias index is, under a su¢ ciently low level of the welfare-neutral
income, larger when using yN as a ctitious income in comparison to the ad-
justment based on past incomes. The comparison of Figures 3 and 4 illustrates
that corollary. The selection bias index takes larger values when the adjustment
is based on the welfare-neutral, rather than on the past incomes. This reects
that the selection biases shown on Figures 3 and 4 have di¤erent informational
contents. What the comparison of Figures 3 and 4 reveals is that the selection
bias is much larger once one expects a poverty measure to take into account
20For each country, the poverty threshold is xed at 60 % of the median income.
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not only the "missing poor" (as on Figure 3), but, also, the "missing poverty"
(premature death being counted as a source of poverty).
Figure 4: Selection bias index for FGT
measures, total population (ctitious income =
welfare-neutral income)
Another important thing to be stressed is that, on Figure 4, the size of the
selection bias index varies strongly across FGT poverty measures, and is much
larger for squared poverty gap measures ( = 2) than for average poverty gaps
( = 1) and headcount ratios ( = 0). The size of the rise of the selection
bias index when  is increased is substantial, especially for countries such as
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The intuition behind those larger
increase in the selection bias index for those countries lies in the fact that the
intensity of poverty in unadjusted terms is very low in those countries. Hence,
given that unadjusted average poverty gap and squared poverty gap measures
are low, the inclusion, within the income distribution, of the prematurely dead
persons with very low incomes (equal to yN ) generates a quite strong rise in
the intensity of poverty, in comparison to a low intensity in unadjusted terms.
That rise is reinforced by the fact that poverty lines are much larger in those
countries. Those larger poverty threshold lead to a higher intensity of poverty
when the "missing persons" are added with a ctitious income equal to the
welfare-neutral income (which is much lower than the poverty line).
In the light of Figures 3 and 4, it appears that the noise or interferences
caused by income-di¤erentiated mortality have di¤erent e¤ects on poverty mea-
surement across classes of FGTmeasures and across countries. Eastern economies
are characterized by larger income-related di¤erentials in survival conditions.
Therefore, the adjustment strongly raises headcount poverty measures for those
countries. On the contrary, Nordic economies su¤er from lower income-related
di¤erentials in survival conditions, so that the number of "missing" persons is
lower. This explains why Nordic economies exhibit lower selection bias indexes
when  = 0. However, for Nordic countries, the adjustment has a bigger impact
on distribution-sensitive poverty indicators ( > 0), since these were very low
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in unadjusted terms, and since the poverty line is larger in Nordic economies.
Hence, once we take the intensity of poverty into account, Nordic countries
exhibit selection bias indexes close to the ones of Eastern economies.
In sum, the selection bias induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality in a
given economy varies depending on (1) the ctitious incomes assigned to the
prematurely dead persons; (2) the class of FGT poverty measure that is used.
The determinant (1) plays a crucial role: when the ctitious income assigned to
the prematurely dead persons is equal to the welfare-neutral income, adjusted
poverty measures are much larger than unadjusted poverty measures. But even
for a given adjustment technique, there exist signicant variations in the selec-
tion bias across the classes of FGT measures. Distribution-sensitive measures
are more subject to the selection bias than headcount measures. Furthermore,
the present empirical section also highlights that the size of the selection bias
varies strongly across countries. Those international di¤erentials - in particular
the opposition between Nordic and Eastern Europe - mirror both international
di¤erentials in income-related survival conditions and in the income distribution
(including the level of the poverty line).
7 Concluding remarks
By mechanically reducing the proportion of poor persons in the population,
income-di¤erentiated mortality introduces some noise in the measurement of
poverty. This leads to the Mortality Paradox: a deterioration of the survival
conditions faced by the poor can generate a decline in the measured poverty.
That reduction is puzzling, and is a mere consequence of the absence of the
"missing poor" in the population on which poverty is measured, and of the
ignorance of premature death as a major aspect of poverty (Sen 1998).
This paper examined whether this puzzle for poverty measurement a¤ects
FGT poverty measures. Our questions could be formulated as follows. Are FGT
measures subject to the Mortality Paradox? If yes, are all subclasses of FGT
measures equally subject to the Mortality Paradox?
To answer those questions, we developed a model of income mobility with
risky lifetime to study how robust FGT measures are to variations in survival
conditions. Robustness to mortality changes would make those measures immu-
nized against the Mortality Paradox. We showed that the extent to which FGT
measures are robust to changes in survival conditions depends on whether the
prematurely dead would have, in case of survival, su¤ered from a more severe
poverty than the average surviving population.
Under general conditions, such a robustness does not prevail. This moti-
vated us to propose an adjustment of FGT measures, by extending the lifetime
income proles of the prematurely dead, in line with Kanbur and Mukherjee
(2007) and Lefebvre et al. (2013). Then, taking adjusted FGT measures with
extended lifetime income proles as a benchmark, we identied conditions under
which the selection bias induced by income-di¤erentiated mortality is higher for
distribution-sensitive measures than for headcount measures.
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Finally, we illustrated that discussion by means of data on old-age poverty
in 11 European economies (2007). The measured selection bias varies with
the precise way in which we dene the adjusted poverty measure to which the
unadjusted poverty measure is compared. Moreover, the selection bias induced
by income-di¤erentiated mortality varies also across di¤erent subclasses of FGT
measures. Those biases are lower for headcount measures than for measures
taking the intensity of poverty into account. The size of the selection bias varies
also across countries, depending on the shape of the income distribution, and
on the severity of overmortality due to low income. Whereas Eastern European
countries exhibit much larger selection biases than Nordic European countries
under headcount measures, both Eastern and Nordic countries exhibit large
selection biases when the intensity of poverty is also taken into account.
All in all, our exploratory study illustrates that the interferences caused by
income-di¤erentiated mortality constitute a general problem for poverty mea-
surement, that is, a problem concerns all subclasses of FGT measures and all
countries (more or less advanced). Economies with large (unadjusted) poverty
rates and strong overmortality for the poor are concerned by the selection
bias. But more surprisingly, distribution-sensitive poverty measures for richer
economies with little income-di¤erentiated mortality are also subject to selection
biases. The reason is that, in their case, taking the "missing poor" and the "hid-
den poverty" into account creates a much bigger contrast with the standards
of the surviving populations. Hence, even when considering rich economies,
distribution-sensitive poverty measures are not immunized against selection bi-
ases due to income-di¤erentiated mortality.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us rst rewrite the old age poverty rate as:
P 2 =
1PK
j=1 n
2
j
"
P 1X
k=1
n2k

yP   yk
yP
#
P 2 =
1PK
j=1 jn
1
j
"
KX
k=1
kn
1
k
 
P 1X
l=1
kl

yP   yl
yP
!#
Let us now compute the impact of a change in a survival rate m, with
m  K.
Di¤erentiating P 2 with respect to m yields:
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The rst term of the RHS is negative, while the second term is positive.
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That expression can be simplied to:
PK
k=1 kn
1
k
 
P 1X
l=1
kl
h
yP yl
yP
i!
PK
j=1 jn
1
j
7
P 1X
l=1
ml

yP   yl
yP

9.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us rst rewrite the adjusted old age poverty rate as:
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Di¤erentiating P^ 2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9.3 Proof of Proposition 3
First bullet list item. The adjusted old age poverty rate is:
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Second bullet list item. The adjusted old age poverty rate as:
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9.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The selection bias index B2 can be rewritten as:
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